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Writing the Rules of Socio‐Economic Impact Assessment: Adaptation through
Participation
Sari M. Graben*

I. INTRODUCTION
Co‐management arrangements (‘co‐management’) are increasingly important as a mechanism
for resource management by Indigenous peoples in Canada.1 As a model for shared decision‐
making, co‐management’s aim is to increase the participation of marginalized stakeholders in
regulatory decision‐making.2 In the Northwest Territories, co‐management is a product of a
political movement against centralized development of the region’s resources by the Federal
government. The result of this political movement was the negotiation of several self‐
government and land claim agreements between Indigenous governments and the Federal
government over a 20 year period.3 The agreements established Indigenous ownership over
vast tracts of land. They also established autonomous legislative jurisdiction within defined
territories and the right to participate as decision‐makers in resource management agencies in
the region. What is relevant for the purposes of this paper is that these agreements led to the
promulgation of multiple co‐management boards which now govern resource use in particular
regions of the Northwest Territories.
The co‐management of resources in the Northwest Territories offers insight into how law and
politics can both support and marginalize stakeholder participation within new approaches to
governance (‘new governance’) operating around the world.4 Simply understood, new
*

Doctoral Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto and Fellow, Queen’s University Institute
for Energy and Environmental Policy, Kingston. Email: sarigraben@osgoode.yorku.ca
1

The term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is used here to avoid misnaming particular groups who would not identify with the
term First Nation or Aboriginal. Periodic references to the term ‘Aboriginal’ reflects a particular legal meaning
identified with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982 c.11.
(which recognizes and affirms the rights of Aboriginal peoples, defined as Indian, Metis and Inuit peoples).
2

Co‐management’s central characteristic is that half the members of each board are nominated by local
Indigenous governments. For further definition of co‐management see infra Part II.
3

The Gwich'in Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement was signed on April 22, 1992 and came into force as the
Gwich’in Land Claim Settlement Act, S.C. 1992, c. 53. The Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim
Agreement was signed on September 6, 1993 and came into force as the Sahtu Dene and Metis Land Claim
Settlement Act, S.C. 1994, c. 27. The Tlicho Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement was signed on August 25, 2003
and came into force as the Tlicho Land Claims and Self‐Government Act, S.C. 2005, c. 1. There other contemporary
treaty finalized in the region is the Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims Settlement Act (1984, c. 24).
4

As a school of thought see O. Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342‐470.
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governance is an alternative to the formulation and implementation of top‐down, government‐
sourced rules. It advocates for the creation of rules by stakeholders through a bottom‐up
process premised on decentralization, adaptive learning, participation, and public‐private
collaboration. New governance predicts more effective and legitimate regulation5 will result
from broad stakeholder input (including marginalized stakeholders) during the construction and
implementation of regulatory rules. This predicted improvement is attributed to the increased
ability of stakeholders to influence regulation in a manner which reflects their perspective.
Where the rules are not to their advantage, stakeholders are expected to benefit from the
deliberation itself.6
The design and practice of co‐management arrangements in the Northwest Territories reflect
many of these trends. By virtue of their representation on the boards, co‐management in the
Northwest Territories purports to increase the participation of Indigenous stakeholders. More
to the point, co‐management replaces centralized processes with de‐centered decision‐making
that aims to use the knowledge of communities impacted by resource development.7 It also
expects co‐management to produce more equitable power sharing between the Federal and
Indigenous governments in the region. Both of these goals are to be achieved through
increased participation of Indigenous stakeholders in decision‐making.8 In effect, co‐
management expects stakeholder participation to provide knowledge and power to resource
management and, in doing so, alter decision‐making accordingly.
While new governance scholarship focuses on the positive aspects of stakeholder collaboration,
it rarely analyzes one of its fundamental assumptions: that the community stakeholder is a
single and unified entity, capable of bringing its knowledge to bear on decision‐making.9
5

Although this paper focuses on the regulatory activity of an administrative state agency, it uses a broader
definition of regulation to capture the regulatory effects of unintentional and ‘intentional activity of attempting to
control, order, or influence the behaviour of others.’ C. Parker, C. Scott, N. Lacey, J. Braithwaite (eds) Regulating
Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 2.
6

Deliberation is defined as the ‘debate of alternatives on the basis of considerations that all take to be relevant.’ J.
Cohen and J. Rogers, ‘Power and Reason’ in Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory
Governance Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (eds) (London: Verso, 2003) 237‐258, 241.
7

Stephen R. Tyler, In_Focus: Comanagement of Natural Resources Local Learning For Poverty Reduction (IDRC
2006) 21‐30.
8

E., Pinkerton, Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries (UBC Press, 1989) (knowledge sharing leads to better
technical management) and M.E., Mulrennan, and C.H., Scott, ‘Co‐management ‐ An Attainable Partnership? Two
Cases from James Bay, Northern Quebec and Torres Strait, Northern Queensland’ (2005) 47(2) Anthropologica
197‐213 (power sharing).
9

A. Agrawal and C. Gibson, ‘Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource
Conservation’ (1999) 27, No. 4 Yale World Development 629‐649, 633
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Moreover, new governance has yet to turn its attention to how its processes disempower
certain sub‐groups or individuals within communities.10 Instead, it posits the stakeholder as
possessing certain interests that are defined as a result of negotiations. While it may be useful
to theorize the community stakeholder as one indivisible entity, it is not analytically descriptive
of the diversity of opinions within communities.
This paper affirms that it is possible for marginalized stakeholders to participate in new
governance arrangements like co‐management and to alter decision‐making. The study of
participation presented here illustrates: 1) that a high level of agency support for community
participation in rulemaking can lead to rules which reflect community values; and 2) that
agency implementation of community values has led to the increased use of stakeholder
collaboration as a mechanism for community empowerment. Nonetheless, the paper also
reveals that there are limitations on the ability to translate social needs into privately
negotiated agreements. Where negotiations depart from highly commoditized terms and
attempt to include diverse community values, stakeholder participation is bounded.
Consequently, this paper questions the ability to use community participation, as conceived by
new governance, to meet the goals of deliberative democratic theory. To be clear, it does not
take issue with the beneficial impact of private agreements for communities. However, it does
question the apparent failure of these private agreements to grapple with social goals and
argues that this failure poses a challenge to using new governance as a replacement for
traditional public administration.
Part I of this paper explains the relationship of new governance scholarship to participation by
exploring its origins in traditional regulation and participatory rights. Part II of this paper draws
parallels between new governance and co‐management theory. It explains their shared
commitment to techniques of decentralization, participation, collaboration, and learning as well
as their shared expectation that these techniques will enhance marginalized stakeholder
participation. This part also identifies some problems with the conceptualization of community
stakeholder upon which new governance and co‐management rely. Part III uses a case study of
rule‐making and rule application by the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board
(Review Board) to support the argument that co‐management reflects new governance’s trends
to incorporate greater stakeholder participation. Specifically, it examines the role of the agency
in making and implementing guidelines. With this in mind, Part IV introduces a critique that the
difficulty of translating certain community values into negotiated terms means that effective
participation may be more limited than new governance has so far allowed in its prognosis of
stakeholder collaboration.

10

For issues that result from participation see Stijn Smismans, ‘New Governance ‐ The Solution for Active European
Citizenship, or the End of Citizenship’ (2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 595‐622.
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II. NEW GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION
A. STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF LIMITED PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
New governance theory is generally understood as a response to traditional administrative
regulation. The legitimacy of traditional administrative regulation is generally premised on
broad statutory authorization as well as the technical and administrative expertise needed to
grapple with highly technical decision‐making.11 The common criticism of this model is that it
vests agencies with significant power since they operate with little oversight in the
establishment of regulatory goals and the decisions needed to achieve them.12 The gradual rise
of participatory processes has arguably altered the level of deference enjoyed by an expert
administration. Essentially, through various liberal democratic procedures, the public can
access relevant information and make submissions through supplementary consultative
processes, such as notice and comment requirements.13 These participatory procedures are
rationalized as bolstering the legitimacy of the decisions by encouraging public acceptability
and by altering the substantive policy to reflect public input.
According to deliberative democrats, the central problem with participatory proceduralism is
that it does not provide the chance to challenge elite power.14 Because citizen viewpoints are
incorporated only as far as the bureaucratic structure permits, proceduralism does not permit
citizen deliberation to permeate decision‐making.15As it relates to marginalized persons,
participatory procedures are accused of using ostensibly neutral rationalistic practices which
exclude or silence particular kinds of oppressed subjects.16 Consequently, scholars raise the

11

For an example of this approach see James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (Yale University Press, 1938). In
the Canadian context see John Willis, ‘Administrative Decision and the Law: The Views of a Lawyer’ The Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, (1958) Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Nov. 502‐511.
12

R. B. Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’, (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667‐1813, 1676‐1688.

13

In addition to rights made explicit in the written constitution, liberal democratic procedures includes doctrines
such as the rule of law and procedural fairness which underpin individual protection against unchecked
governmental power.
14

R. B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 21st Century, (2003) 78 N.Y.U. Law Review 437‐460, 445.

15

J. Habermas, Between Fact and Norm: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (translated
William Rheg) (MIT Press, 1998).
16

I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990).
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need for democratic politics to concern itself first and foremost with the recognition of the
particular perspectives of historically‐oppressed segments of the population.17
One suggestion has been to reform state structures to better accommodate difference. To
these deliberative democrats, the institutions of the liberal state (constitutional assemblies,
legislatures, courts, and administration) remain significant venues for deliberation.
Consequently, they have suggested ways in which those institutions can better accommodate
different perspectives. 18 However, the modification of institutions to be more tolerant of
difference has been criticized as failing to address the broader problems of insufficient
participation in the regulatory process. This criticism laid the groundwork for an approach
aimed at the both the justice and effectiveness of legal institutions premised on participation ‐
new governance.19
Building on these critiques, new governance theorists argue that traditional structures provide
limited opportunities for marginalized groups to meaningfully participate in establishing the
means and ends of regulation.20 Consequently, criticism aimed at liberal democratic
proceduralism partly stems from concerns with its deliberative democratic credentials.
Essentially, new governance theorists reject state structured institutions in which deliberation
is proceduralized and codified via binding general laws. They reject a reading of popular
sovereignty in which a single deliberative legislature purports to legitimately represent the
plurality of people and associations which empower it.21 Instead, the theory expects citizens to
deliberate as part of a de‐centered civil society characterized by a multiplicity of associations.22
Within it, citizens are expected to generate collective decisions that are determined via
reasoned debate between all concerned.23
17

I. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000).

18

For an example of the reformist position see Anne Phillips, ‘Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas or a
Politics of Presence?’ in S. Benhabib (ed) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political
(Princeton University Press, 1996) 139‐152. For an example of the radical position see Chantal Mouffe,
‘Democracy, Power, and the ‘Political’ ’ in S. Benhabib (ed) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries
of the Political, (Princeton University Press, 1996), 245–56.
19

A. Fung and E. Wright (ed) ‘Thinking About Empowered Participatory Democracy’ in Deepening Democracy:
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003) 3‐41.
20

Id.

21

W. E. Scheuerman, ‘Critical Theory Beyond Habermas’ in The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, J.S. Dryzek, B.
Honig, and A. Phillips (eds.) (OUP, 2006) 85‐105, 97.

22

S. Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’ in Democracy and Difference: Contesting
the Boundaries of the Political, (ed) (Princeton University Press, 1996) 67‐ 94 at 73; J. Cohen and J. Rogers,
‘Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance’ (1992) 20 Politics & Society 393.
23

Jurgen Habermas, Between Fact and Norm: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (trans
William Rheg) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). Habermas envisions a public civil society. However, new governance
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In deliberative decision‐making, participants are meant to listen to each other, give due
consideration to each position and choose a decision as a group. Participants are expected to
persuade one another by offering reasons that others can accept. Importantly, participants are
not entitled to adopt absolute values or positions.24 Rather, to deliberate means to debate
alternatives on the basis of considerations that all participants take to be relevant. However,
what is relevant is disciplined by the reasons supported by other participants.25 Achieved
through ongoing deliberative processes, new governance stands in contrast to limited
procedural rights in which citizens engage in one‐shot consultation. Instead of merely creating
processes by which persons have rights of access to relevant information, to make submissions
and to use courts to enforce consideration of their viewpoints, deliberation expects to convert
the local citizenry into decision‐makers. Ultimately, both the motivating ideology which drives
new governance and the legalities needed to support this objective vary from a procedural
concept of public participation. Instead, it offers participation in deliberation. To this extent,
deliberative democracy promises to emancipate the powerless or oppressed in so far as it
promises to hear their arguments and empower those arguments deemed reasonable.26

B. STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN NEW GOVERNANCE
Legal theorists propose that one cure to the democratic deficit caused by central administration
is to increase the participation of stakeholders in decision‐making.27 Regulatory methods that
permit stakeholders more input in decision‐making and its regular alteration are expected to
ease the problems created by over reliance on centralized command and control.28
Consequently, stakeholder participation has become the key mechanism for establishing the
normative authority of regulation in new‐governance.

scholars would argue that broad public participation includes private as well as public actors. For example, A. Fung
and E. Wright (ed) ‘Thinking About Empowered Participatory Democracy’ in Deepening Democracy: Innovations in
Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003).
24

A. Fung and E. Wright, ‘Thinking About Empowered Participatory Democracy’ in Deepening Democracy:
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003) at 20.
25

J. Cohen and J. Rogers, ‘Power and Reason’ in A. Fung and E. Wright (ed) Deepening Democracy: Innovations in
Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003). 237‐258 at 241.
26

Id.

27

C. Sabel and M. Dorf, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism (Harvard University Press, 2006).

28

R. B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 21st Century, (2003) 78 N.Y.U. Law Review 437‐460, 447.
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For example, one way that new‐governance expects participation to legitimate regulation is
through the sharing of knowledge which participants possess. Of course, participation has long
been used as a legal mechanism which permits groups to communicate views on a public issue.
However, participation takes on a grander role in new governance.29 While premised on the
complex ways information travels, information is expected to come from the participation of
stakeholders impacted by the regulation in question. Consequently, many participatory
theories advocate for new methods by which regulatory agencies and citizens can share
information. Instead of command and control, new governance advocates call for smart
regulation, responsive regulation30, reflexive regulation,31 democratic experimentalism,32 and
collaborative governance.33 Similarly, ‘empowered participatory governance’ is intended to
produce “effective problem solving, equity, and broad and deep participation premised on the
institutionalization of the ongoing participation of ordinary citizens.”34 Its goal is to allow
citizens (as represented by communities or as individuals) to exchange knowledge, thereby
disrupting decision‐making premised on the domination by hierarchical structures.
A second way that new‐governance expects stakeholder participation to legitimate regulation is
by achieving participant agreement. At its core, this scholarship takes the legitimating power of
participation (previously applied to traditional governmental institutions) and applies them to
those of the de‐centered regulatory state.35 It seeks to broaden room for decision‐making by
involving more actors at various stages and types of decision‐making.36 In doing so, it expects
stakeholders to stabilize the final decision as well as all the smaller decisions along the
regulatory path. To this end, new governance advocates for the use of more flexible and
coordinated techniques to allow for negotiation and deliberation between stakeholders (e.g.
29

A. Fung and E. Wright, ‘Thinking About Empowered Participatory Democracy’ in Deepening Democracy:
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003) 3‐41, 17.
30

Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992);

31

G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239.

32

C. Sabel and M. Dorf, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism (Harvard University Press, 2006).

33

J. Freeman, ‘Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State’ (1997) 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1‐98; B. Karkkainen,
‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism’ (2002) 21 Va. Envtl. L. J. 189‐244.

34

A. Fung and E. Wright, ‘Thinking About Empowered Participatory Democracy’ in Deepening Democracy:
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003) 3‐41, 25–27.
35

De‐centering presumes non‐state centres as decision‐makers. For distinction between de‐centered and
polycentric regulatory regimes see J. Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137–164.

36

O. Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’
(2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342‐470 at 373.
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government, industry, and the public) and to produce innovative decision‐making.37 For
example, scholars advocate for a ‘rolling rule regime’ in which local units of stakeholders
collaboratively set targets and report to regulatory agencies.38 Others call for ‘collaborative
governance’ which emphasizes negotiation, multilateralism, adaptation, and provisionalism
between stakeholders and an agency.39 Similarly, advocacy for a ‘bargaining model’ relies on
regulatory contracts to achieve dynamic regulation.40 Taken together, these techniques rely on
increased tolerance for methods such as negotiated and consensus‐based approaches to
regulation so that each of the stakeholders will accept the process and its outcome.

III.

CO‐MANAGEMENT AS NEW GOVERNANCE

A. WHAT IS CO‐MANAGEMENT
There is not, as yet, a clear and precise definition of the term ‘co‐management’ which can
include a range of institutional arrangements. The term describes institutions which rely on
various degrees of integration between local representative bodies and state level
management systems. 41 In Canada, co‐management arrangements are decision‐making bodies
37

See for example, P. Harter, ‘Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise’ (1982) 71 Georgetown Law Journal,
17. For environmental techniques see D. Farber, ‘Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models
of Environmental Regulation’ (2000) U. Ill. L. Rev. 61‐82; In Canada, these procedural mechanisms are
implemented through statutory requirements, common law requirements and administrative procedures
developed by administrative agencies. Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2004) For a discussion of co‐management as an adaptive system, see D. Armitage, F. Berkes, and N.
Doubleday (eds) Adaptive Co‐Management: Collaboration, Learning and Multi‐Level Governance (UBC Press, 2008).
For application to environmental assessment see J. Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of Decision‐
Making (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
38

C. Sabel, A. Fung, and B. Karkkainen, ‘Beyond Backyard Environmentalism’, in J. Cohen and J. Rodgers (eds)
Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, (Boston: New Democracy Forum, 2000) 3‐48.
39

J. Freeman, ‘Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State’ (1997) 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1‐98, 21‐33; J.
Freeman and D. Farber, ‘Modular Environmental Regulation’ (2006) 54 Duke L.J. 795‐939; B. Karkkainen,
‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism’ (2002) 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 189‐244, 193‐94.
For a broader discussion of collaborative management for natural resources see Julia M. Wondolleck & Steven L.
Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in Natural Resource Management (Washington D.C.:
Island Press 2000).
40

J. Freeman & L.I. Langbein, ‘Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit’, (2000) 9 N.Y.U. Envtl L. J. 60‐
151, 75‐121; J. Rossi, ‘Bargaining In The Shadow Of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking
Settlement’ (2001) 51 Duke L.J. 1015‐1058. D. Farber, ‘Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging
Models of Environmental Regulation’ (2000) U. Ill. L. Rev. 61‐82, 68‐81.

41

J. Kooiman et al, Fish for Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries (Amsterdam University Press, 2005) at 14‐24
(co‐management as co‐governance); P.J. Usher, ‘Contemporary Aboriginal Land, Resource and Environmental
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comprising particular Indigenous governments and state agencies. However, as a term, co‐
management is not confined to arrangements with Indigenous peoples nor does it preclude
local non‐governmental actors or individuals. Formed as an alternative to centralized decision‐
making prototypical of resource management, it is a model for shared decision‐making over
natural resource use. Beyond this colloquial understanding there is a significant degree of
controversy over the goals and methods of co‐management.42 Consequently, there is a limited
ability to use the term as an analytical tool.
Co‐management arrangements vary with the nature of the resource, the political context, the
expertise of participants, the authority exercised, and the range of management decisions
involved.43 At one end of the spectrum, natural resource management remains with the state,
which consults communities only on specific issues. At the other end of the spectrum,
communities make resource management decisions but report to the state. In between, there
are a wide range of institutional possibilities. Co‐management describes dealing with both
renewable and nonrenewable resources; single resource and multi‐resource development, as
well as both single jurisdiction and multi‐jurisdictional circumstances. In addition, membership
can be strictly limited to local resource users and governments or can include any number of
stakeholder groups. Each type of board uses different regulative methods for decision‐making.
These methods can include policy‐making, planning, setting rules, allocating harvests, investing
in resource productivity, monitoring, enforcement, determining membership in user groups,
and adjudicating conflicts. The scope of the resources being managed can also vary between
boards as does the formality of the arrangement.
The co‐management board studied here, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review
Board (Review Board), is one of several co‐management boards in the Mackenzie Valley, a
region in the Northwest Territories.44 Like other boards in the region, it was established
pursuant to the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (MVRMA).45 The MVRMA was
itself established pursuant to the terms of several formal contemporary treaties with
Indigenous peoples in the region.46 As a product of treaty negotiations, the authority of the
Regimes: Origins, Problems and Prospects’ in For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy of the Royal
Commission for Aboriginal Peoples CD‐ROM. (Ottawa: Libraxus, 1997) (co‐management as institutionalized
relationships).
42

S.R. Tyler, In_Focus: Co‐management Of Natural Resources: Local Learning For Poverty Reduction (International
Development Research Centre 2006).
43

For different permutations see Id. at 21‐30.

44

G. Rusnak, ‘Co‐Management of Natural Resources in Canada: A Review of Concepts and Case Studies’ Working
Paper 1, Rural Poverty and the Environment Working Paper Series. (International Development Research Centre,
1997).
45

MACKENZIE VALLEY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT, S.C. 1998, c.25.

46

See supra, note 3.
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Review Board is constitutionally protected and would be difficult to alter.47 Tasked with
environmental assessment, the Review Board has a broad mandate to consider any significant
impact of a proposed project, including both biophysical and human environments. It is not a
community based arrangement because it includes nominees of both Indigenous and non‐
Indigenous governments. Nor does it have any formal obligation to report to communities.
Instead, the Review Board is an agency made up of nominees of the Indigenous, Federal and
Territorial governments. Moreover, like all co‐management boards in the region, the Review
Board is an institution of public government. It is established pursuant to Federal statute,
funded by the Federal government and reports to the Federal Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs. Clearly, the Review Board represents a formal and highly bureaucratic type of co‐
management arrangement.
This paper offers a detailed case study of one agency’s ability to act as a proponent of
stakeholder participation. While conclusions about new governance often involve multiple case
studies, the sheer volume of disparate arrangements which fall under the ambit of ‘co‐
management’ means that its analysis benefits from a specific approach which identifies
successful or poor results.48 That being said, the transnational proliferation of co‐management
arrangements makes it a global phenomenon which invites generalizations. Beyond its
relevance to other co‐management institutions, it is also part of a suite of participatory
arrangements used in resource management.49 Therefore, rather than being a limited example
of Canadian institutions, co‐management is one of a series of institutional arrangements aimed
at furthering participatory governance. Likewise, the shared characteristics and techniques of
co‐management and new governance make it one of several techniques of environmental
regulation within new governance. For instance, civic environmentalism,50 eco‐pragmatism,51

47

The agreements are constitutionally protected pursuant to s.35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
48

For a discussion of case specific approaches see S.R. Tyler, In_Focus: Co‐management of Natural Resources Local
Learning For Poverty Reduction (International Development Research Centre, 2006).
49

For examples, J.P. Brosius, A. Lowenhaupt Tsing and C. Zerner (eds) Communities and Conservation: Histories and
Politics of Community Based Natural Resource Management (Altamira Press: 2005).
50

DeWitt John, Civic Environmentalism: Alternatives to Regulation in States and Communities (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Books, 1994) and William A. Shutkin, the Land That Could Be: Environmentalism and
Democracy in the Twenty First Century (Boston: MIT Press, 2000). For contrary views see T.D. Abel and M.
Stephen, ‘The Limits of Civic Environmentalism’ (December 2000) vol. 44(4) American Behavioral Scientist.

51

Daniel A Farber, ‘Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco‐pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect’
(2002‐2003) 87 Minn. L. Rev. 851.
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and collaborative management,52 has each drawn significant attention to new methods of
problem solving for environmental disputes. Co‐management is also one such method.

B. SHARED CHARACTERISTICS ‐ NEW GOVERNANCE & THE REVIEW BOARD
From a formal legal perspective, the Review Board might be characterized as a traditional
administrative agency. However, the legal derivation of the Review Board’s authority does not
do justice to its political origins, goals or techniques, all of which are better reflected in new
governance trends. Like new‐governance, co‐management uses participation as a technique of
regulation. This is why the current turn to new governance is often contrasted with the
technical tools of traditional regulatory government. If the traditional model is hierarchical,
state‐centric, bureaucratic, top‐down, commanding, controlling, and expert‐driven,
participatory governance means to break with these characteristics.53 As a general rule, it
prescribes techniques which are participatory, bottom‐up, consensus‐oriented, contextual,
flexible, integrative and pragmatic. A brief review of these similarities makes their shared
techniques more apparent.
One of the seminal ways that the Review Board follows the broader trends in new governance
is its commitment to an expanded role for stakeholder participation in decision‐making.54 Much
like new governance, the Review Board facilitates the participation of community stakeholders
as representatives in public governance.55 Stakeholder participation is primarily achieved
through the requirement that persons nominated by Indigenous governments constitute at
least equal or majority membership on the boards. For instance, all licensing and permitting
related to resource use in the Mackenzie Valley are conducted by boards whose membership
comprises specific numerical representation. Each of the Indigenous governments in the region
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nominates or appoints members to the board.56 The remaining members are nominated by the
territorial minister and federal government.
The use of representative membership subverts the central tenet that centralized management
is an appropriate tool for resource management in the Mackenzie Valley. Like new governance,
representation in co‐management is directly related to regulatory interest. As might be
expected, resource management representation is delineated in accordance with the type of
rights an Indigenous government holds in relation to the land. Where the Indigenous
government is thought to have a greater vested interest in the outcome, such as a project
conducted on its fee simple land, it is granted greater representation on the boards. Where its
interest is deemed lesser or is only one among other interested governments, its
representation is lessened correspondingly. In short, the shifting composition of a board
reflects an attempt to allocate board membership in accordance with an estimation of interest
in the proposal.
In contrast to participatory proceduralism, new governance allows Indigenous citizens to move
beyond procedural rights and participate as decision‐makers at multiple stages of regulation.57
Co‐management matches this innovation as it allows Indigenous citizens to participate as
decision‐makers in resource management. Indigenous peoples have been identified in the
common law as stakeholders in resource management.58 However, it is through co‐
management that the relevance of being a stakeholder has increased participation in decision‐
making.59 While the degree of participation varies, the underlying principle of co‐management
is the same. Indigenous peoples are now part of the institutions in which collective decisions
are deliberated. Indigenous stakeholders do not merely have procedural rights to access
relevant information, to make submissions on environmental decisions and to use courts to
enforce consideration of their viewpoints. Instead, like new governance, co‐management offers
participation in deliberation.

56
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A second similarity between co‐management and new governance is the affirmation of
decentralization and subsidiarity as central organizing principles.60 Like other co‐management
boards in the Mackenzie Valley, the Review Board was created in opposition to centralized
resource management.61 Understanding co‐management as a deliberate effort to decentralize
decision‐making derives from its contextualization in contemporary treaty negotiation in the
Mackenzie Valley and Indigenous claims to self‐government.62 As stated in the introduction to
this paper, co‐management in the Mackenzie Valley was a product of a political movement
against resource development by the Federal government. The combination of the Federal
government’s property claims and its regulatory power to license development led to the
widespread authorization of projects without consultation with local Indigenous communities.63
Growing political consciousness fueled the development of territorial political autonomy and
Indigenous peoples in the region began to assert themselves as distinct peoples with inherent
rights. Not only were the boards formed on the basis of rights recognition preceding the
treaties. Those rights were then re‐formulated in treaty provisions delineating Indigenous
representation on resource management boards. In short, the phenomenon of co‐
management is part of a larger movement to actualize Aboriginal rights to self‐government in
Canada over the past 40 years. Those rights have been channeled into new agencies that are
physically located in the region and staffed with governmental appointees, half of which are
nominated or appointed by local Indigenous governments. As such, co‐management mimics
the shift away from centralized development which characterizes new governance initiatives.
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A third similarity with new governance is that co‐management expects stakeholders to engage
in deliberation which puts collaboration and flexibility at the forefront.64 Co‐management
scholars and practitioners describe a similar shift towards adaptive processes, feedback
learning, and flexible partnerships through collaboration and learning.65 This manifests in the
deliberation required of representative board members as well as expectations for stakeholder
collaboration. Hence, this paper will describe how community stakeholders become involved in
generating the rules which regulate environmental assessment.66 However, the case study will
also describe how the Review Board uses stakeholder participation to facilitate multiparty
cooperation and exchange of information in environmental assessment itself. In truth,
environmental assessment processes are prone to collaborative techniques. For example,
developers are commonly tasked with generating their own assessment report which the
agency uses to evaluate environmental impacts. Therefore, in contrast to the traditional model,
the Review Board is already changed from strict regulator to facilitator by virtue of
environmental assessment procedures.67 However, within co‐management, collaborative forms
of management reflect the belief that natural resource use is a question of negotiation and
agreement among stakeholders.68 Much like new governance, informal and negotiated
processes dominate much of co‐management’s regulatory output.69
A fourth characteristic shared in common with new governance is that both theories advocate
for a holistic and dynamic approach to problem solving.70 This approach recognizes that
doctrinal boundaries between legal issues will be overcome if parties can question impacts and
relationships between domains.71 Similarly, co‐management expects increased knowledge will
64
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65

D. Armitage, F. Berkes and N. Doubleday (ed) Adaptive Co‐Management: Collaboration, Learning and Multi‐Level
Governance (UBC Press, 2008).
66

Infra, Part III.

67

Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of Decision‐Making (Oxford: OUP, 2004).

68

D. Armitage, F. Berkes, and N. Doubleday (eds) ‘Introduction: Moving Beyond Co‐Management’ in Adaptive Co‐
Management: Collaboration, Learning and Multi‐Level Governance (UBC Press, 2007) 1‐15, 4.
69

P. Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada (LexisNexis utterworths, 2004). For an Australian case study
see C. O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Making Social Impact Assessment Count: A Negotiation‐based Approach for Indigenous
Peoples’ (1999) 12 Society and Natural Resources, 63‐80.
70

O. Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’
(2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342‐470 at 385‐387
71

Id.

2010]

WRITING THE RULES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT

17

lead to the overall improvement of resource and wildlife management.72 Advocates expect that
“more holistic insights into ecosystems dynamics would result from an integration of traditional
and science based knowledge.”73 For example, statutory provisions which permit reliance on
Traditional Knowledge reinforce the power of the agencies to search out and use oral histories
and elder testimonies as part of the evidentiary record.74 This use of alternative knowledge
expects it to alter regulation much like new governance expects that participatory processes
will continuously change regulation to reflect new information transmitted by stakeholders.
Ultimately, co‐management arrangements can be traced to the same post‐socialist project of
the Left as certain scholarship identified with new governance.75 Both work with a limited belief
in the competence and capacity of the central state to address the economic and social needs
of its citizenry.76 Rather than limiting itself to procedural rights, co‐management builds on the
same participatory democratic strand of new governance. It looks to construct models in which
local marginalized stakeholders can be involved more directly in regulation and collective
problem solving, with some form of centre that coordinates local efforts.77 This is rationalized
as providing a more equitable distribution of resources and more effective problem solving.

C. COMMUNITY AS STAKEHOLDER
1. How NG Structures Community as Stakeholder
A by‐product of both co‐management and new governance arrangements has been the
identification of communities as stakeholders. Community is implicated in resource
management through the development of participatory initiatives that seek to include local
actors in decision‐making. Much like other governance arrangements, community stakeholders
are rationalized as those closest to the problem and therefore best thought to navigate
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environmental regulatory conflict.78 This can be traced to conceptualizing bottom‐up
participation and devolution as key to participatory initiatives.79 Within this conceptualization,
local actors are rarely identified as individuals.80 Rather, the institutionalized participation of
select organizations is expected to represent the needs of individuals.81 As Stijn Smismans
writes on the relationship between new governance and citizenship:
Although in theory, individual stakeholders could be involved in policy
making, in practice this happens mainly through the participation of
functional intermediaries. Stakeholder participation normally implies
group participation.82
Primarily through board representation, co‐management applies this same principle of
stakeholder participation to Indigenous communities. It is expected that Indigenous
perspectives will be represented by individuals appointed or nominated by local Indigenous
governments. The allocation of representative status to governments reflects the reality that
Indigenous persons in the Mackenzie Valley are members of a community that is defined by its
governmental authority as well as its traditional clan or tribal membership.
In addition to board representation, co‐management agencies also incorporate concepts of
community through the exercise of their mandates. For example, the Review Board in this case
study regularly draws on public participation to obtain feedback on the numerous steps
involved in environmental assessment including, but not limited to, the design of rules, the
78
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terms of a particular assessment, and factual determinations. It works intimately with
communities to obtain their input into environmental decisions. The board effectively uses its
authority to generate regulation that reflects deliberation on community‐centered decision‐
making. By doing so, the board allows what it represents as community norms to take a greater
role in decision‐making than previous assessment regimes have allowed.
The case presented here affirms that the process by which Indigenous stakeholders’ values are
incorporated and implemented in rulemaking is evidence of how new governance mechanisms
can increase participation of marginalized stakeholders. Consequently, this paper demonstrates
that the Review Board has used its formal authority to generate guidelines that reflect
community values. Moreover, it argues that this evidences that the Review Board has
effectively undertaken the task of contextualizing environmental assessment in community‐
based perspectives. In addition, the implementation of the guidelines provides further
evidence that the use of agency discretion to support negotiation has resulted in increased
participation for communities in a way that impacts development.
2. Stakeholder as Community is Problematic Because Community is not Homogenous
If new governance and co‐management theories both rely on communities as stakeholders,
they must also contend with the diverse ways community can be conceptualized and the
impact this conceptualization has on theorizing participation. Essentially, the theories must ask,
who is the community? As documented by Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson, current writing on
development and participation has championed the role of community in the realization of
decentralization, participation, autonomy and conservation.83 However, the concept of
community rarely receives the attention or analysis it would require for effective discussion of
resource use and management.
The most fundamental difficulty with the notion of community for environmental decision‐
making is that it often portrays the community as a single and unified entity capable of bringing
its knowledge to bear on decision‐making.84 Thus, literature on community‐based conservation
is criticized as operating with “the mythic community: small, integrated groups using locally
evolved norms to manage resources sustainably and equitably.” 85 Agrawal criticizes these
approaches as unreliable descriptors of how communities effect resource conservation.86

83

A. Agrawal and C. Gibson, ‘Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource
Conservation’ (1999) 27(4) Yale World Development 629‐649.
84

Id. at 633.

85

The three characteristics of community as 1) a small spatial unit; 2) a homogenous social structure; or 3) a group
with shared norms. Id. at 630.
86

Id.

20

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 05

In contrast, empirical studies and common sense reveal a much more complex
conceptualization of community at work. For starters, Indigenous communities are not
comprised of a single group of individuals with similar goals and capacities. Nor are
communities homogenous groups that possess common characteristics with respect to
ethnicity, religion or language. Instead, communities are comprised of sub‐groups and
individuals with varying preferences for resource use and distribution.87 Agrawal argues that
recognition of heterogeneity “indicates that empowering local actors to use and manage their
natural resources is more than the decentralization of authority over natural resources from
the central government to a ‘community’ ”.88 It is better described as the devolution of
authority to a set of institutions and actors that mediate, structure, mold, accentuate, and
facilitate particular outcomes and actions. To Agrawal, one cannot characterize a community
without characterizing the institutions which make the decisions.
Similarly, Tania Murray Li questions how a narrative which differentiates between government
and community makes sense when the community is often a unit of local government.89 “[T]he
development of new institutions that allocate more control over resources and management
authority to local units cannot really be seen as the transfer of power from state to community,
envisaged as separate entities.”90 Li argues that instead, communities should be seen as the
internalization of the state system through territorialization. By this Li means that
decentralization which conceptualizes communities as separate from the state ignores the
state’s role in forming territorially bounded communities and the incorporation of the
community into the state apparatus. Li’s observation focuses attention on how communities
can be constructed or reconstructed through law and politics. Moreover, it refocuses attention
on how political institutions speak in the name of community and the relationship of the
community to the larger governmental apparatus.
Once institutions and actors are identified as the relevant focus of attention, researchers can
better identify divergent interests in development and recognize that these interests may
change as new opportunities emerge. An institutional or actor‐based approach also helps
identify how these divergent interests are empowered by the legal systems which establish and
support communities as stakeholders. For example, the effect of centralized approaches to
87
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resource management is to undermine the legitimacy and formal powers of local communities.
The act of reclaiming authority by the local community over resource management requires re‐
establishing their legitimacy and formal powers. The problem, as Ostrom observes is that, “one
does not re‐create a functioning community by fiat”.91 Nonetheless, legislation which integrates
Indigenous communities in decision‐making presumes that they are automatically capable of
organizing to exercise these rights effectively. Law is used to achieve effective devolution to
local communities previously under‐represented. This use presumes that liberal democratic
structures which legitimate decision‐making elsewhere will operate similarly in local
communities. Scholars critical of simplified notions of community argue that such notions
generate unrealistic expectations of how conflict will arise and be resolved in those
communities.92 It can gloss over substantial internal inequalities such as the construction of
gender,93 relationships to other communities and markets,94 and the strategic use of conflicting
legal systems to gain advantage.95
Rather than presuming that the new system will easily layer on top of the previous system to
promote a community perspective, critics argue that this approach reflects the naïveté of
resource management policies founded on simplified notions of community. Instead, effective
democratization requires asking who within the institution controls the task, the decision‐
making, and the benefits.96 The corollary of this requires asking whether increased participation
allows those sub‐groups and individuals who are not in control a voice. For example, devolution
to ‘traditional’ institutions tends to reinforce existing power relations, which are often male‐
dominated.97 Divisions in community by kinship and religion can also undermine
91
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conceptualizations of community conceived in accordance with liberal democratic principles.98
Equally, accusations that lawful decisions lack cultural authenticity undermine their perceived
legitimacy. Conceptions of what is legitimate within an Indigenous community can be tied to
what is considered authentic of a particular culture. Whether contemporary laws or policies
that are unreflective of traditional Indigenous culture but implemented by resident Indigenous
decision‐makers are legitimate is part a growing debate that engages conceptualizing
community.99
For its part, new governance is just beginning to consider how its processes empower or
disempower certain sub‐groups of community stakeholders.100 Nor has it come to terms with
the fact that that the community stakeholder is not a single unified entity capable of bringing its
knowledge to bear on decision‐making. Instead, it generally theorizes the stakeholder as
possessing certain interests that are defined (albeit flexibly) prior to bargaining. One
commentator ascribes the trend to a focus on the individual.101 Within an approach which
privileges the individual, a community is simply a composite of individuals and can, itself, be
treated as an individual. Therefore, communities are treated as “willful and bounded actors
capable of occupying a seat at the negotiation table, creating alliances, managing risk, making
choices and ultimately pursuing their own strategic ends.”102
The following case study demonstrates that co‐management can also conceptualize the
community as an individual actor. However, expectations of unity most likely flow from the
identification of community with representative government ‐ which itself derives from the
claim to self‐determination by Indigenous peoples. Current governmental structures are a
98
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product of contemporary land claim and self‐government agreements. The result is the
legitimized conceptualization of communities as geographically bounded localities represented
by Indigenous governments. This structure is repeated for each Indigenous people in the
region. Much like Li’s characterization of the community as territorialization, treaty negotiation
has led to the creation of community‐based institutions which can be identified as state‐based
governments. As governments, their submissions to agencies and their legal authority to bind
their constituents are backed by liberal democratic ideals that they speak for the community as
a whole.
While an expectation of community stakeholder unity may be legally accurate, it is not
analytically descriptive of the diversity of opinions within communities. Rather than presume
that representative government is entirely reflective of public interests, it would be more
accurate to suggest that local governments represent particular perspectives on an issue.
These difficulties are not raised here to cast aspersions on governments, Indigenous or non‐
Indigenous. On the contrary; they are raised here to illustrate that Indigenous governments
must currently contend with effectively representing diverse public interests in the face of
expectations that the public interest will be defined and made certain. Without an investigation
of how community stakeholders are constructed and empowered by governance regimes, new
governance and co‐management fail to recognize that there are values which operate at the
community level but are not operationalized in negotiations. These limitations can be
attributed to the failure of negotiation to account for effective representation of those groups’
values and interests.
With these insights in mind, this paper queries whether the inclusion of community
perspectives through negotiation can be easily characterized as participatory as conceived by
deliberative democratic theory. As explained earlier, deliberative democracy promises to
emancipate through its power to hear arguments and empower those arguments deemed
reasonable. Participation is the mechanism to achieve this objective. Because the community
has a greater impact on the terms of development and the agreements may have a regulative
effect, negotiation is rightly theorized as participatory. However, the limitations on its ability to
reflect social values and objectives prevent it from being theorized as a successful conduit for
the hearing of reasoned arguments. Instead, it would be more accurate to identify participation
in making the agreements as participation in the resource market or as an unrealized attempt
to reflect the participatory ideals of deliberative democratic decision‐making. Neither of these
characterizations precludes the possibility that private agreements can have regulatory effect.
However, they do suggest that the failure of these agreements to address certain social
objectives make them an imperfect replacement for regulation led by public institutions.

IV. CASE STUDY: ADAPTING SOCIO‐ECONOMIC GUIDELINES
The previous discussion established that there are shared characteristics and objectives for
marginalized stakeholders in both co‐management and new governance. The seminal question
becomes whether either theory can deliver what it promises. In the hopes of providing some
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answers, this section critically documents the implementation of participatory objectives by the
Review Board. In particular, this section examines the Socio‐Economic Impact Assessment
Guidelines developed by the Review Board.103 The new rules were formulated as a result of
extensive consultation with multiple stakeholders but are highly responsive to feedback from
Indigenous stakeholders. The result is a set of rules which encourages private stakeholders to
engage in participatory practices directly with communities as an alternative to agency
evaluation.
Guidelines are secondary rules used by administrative agencies to set out the general approach
that an agency plans to take in exercising its statutory powers. The Review Board’s legal
authority to generate the SEIA guidelines is derived from section 120 of the MVRMA.104 It
authorizes the Review Board to establish guidelines respecting processes, including guidelines
for the determination of the scope of developments, the form and content of reports and the
submission and distribution of environmental impact statements. The Review Board has so far
produced three sets of guidelines as follows: 1) Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines;
2) Socio‐Economic Impact Assessment Guidelines; 3) Guidelines for Incorporating Traditional
Knowledge in Environmental Impact Assessment.105 The SEIA guidelines outline the Review
Board’s expectations for assessment of proposed developments that may have socio‐economic
and cultural impacts. By examining the creation and application of rules on socio‐economic
assessment, this section describes how the Review Board replaces traditional regulatory
schemes with participatory and decentralized arrangements.

A. SEIA GUIDELINE CREATION
1. Guideline Consultation
Prior to formulating the SEIA guidelines, the Review Board undertook extensive consultation
with each of the impacted stakeholders. Documenting the alterations made to the SEIA
guidelines from their original formulation in the discussion paper to finalized guidelines, this
section details how the SEIA guidelines were adapted as a result of community participation.
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MACKENZIE VALLEY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW SOCIO‐ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES available at
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The Review Board began drafting the SEIA guidelines with a discussion paper titled “Issues and
Recommendations for Social and Economic Impact Assessment in the Mackenzie Valley.”106
Written with the assistance of an external consultant the paper outlined the requirement for
SEIA processes under the MVRMA and suggested improvements for future assessments. The
Review Board circulated that paper to various stakeholders.107 In addition to obtaining feedback
on the paper, the Review Board was also introducing the idea of socio‐economic assessment to
the region. Hence, the Review Board adopted a pedagogic approach to discussing socio‐
economic impacts. Identifying the need to “raise the bar” for SEIA108 Review Board staff
spearheaded an effort to “awaken” the Mackenzie Valley to the benefits of this assessment. 109
The paper identified a number of socio‐economic impacts, many of which were later echoed by
communities. However, the language of the guidelines most definitely reflected the concerns
of Western scientific literature on environmental protection. For instance, the paper posed
sustainable development as a solution to impacts from development.110 Prominent in
environmental assessment, sustainable development would almost be a given in any
discussion. Moreover, the paper focused on the stages of SEIA and what technical tools are
required to achieve each stage. For instance, in regards to economic analysis the paper notes
that “[a]nalysis of economic impacts is technical and quantitative, and requires fiscal and
technical capacity if it is to be undertaken in the course of economic impact assessment.”111
Consequently, the discussion paper recommended the use of fiscal analysis, cost‐benefit
analysis, input‐output analysis and measuring intangibles.112
106

Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board with assistance from Consilium and Gartner Lee Limited,
Issues and Recommendations for Social and Economic Impact Assessment in the Mackenzie Valley, (2002)
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Using the paper as a starting point for discussion, the Review Board then adopted an iterative
process to obtain stakeholder input into the content of the guidelines. Starting in September
2005, the Board actively engaged every party it thought should have input into designing
effective SEIA. It canvassed developers, government departments, consultants involved in SEIA
and other parties in focus groups. It also spent a good deal of time canvassing the residents and
communities of the Mackenzie Valley. The Review Board undertook extensive community visits
and meetings to discuss socio‐economic impact assessment.113 The Board summarized
community feedback in a report titled, “Community Visits 2005: Raising the Bar for Socio‐
Economic Impact Assessment, A Report on What Communities Told Us”114
The Report organized the various concerns expressed by communities under two headings:
concerns with impacts and concerns with process. Importantly, much of the language
prominent in the circulated discussion paper was absent from the community report. In
comparing the initial discussion paper and the community report real differences in language
and approach become apparent. First and foremost, the language of sustainable development
was completely absent from the community report. While some literature considers there to be
many similarities between the principles of sustainable development and Indigenous resources
use, the discourse of sustainable development has not been widely used in Northern
communities and may be at odds with decision‐making.115 Hence, its absence from any
community recommendations is notable but not unexpected.
Also absent from the community report are references to the technical tools needed to
determine socio‐economic impacts. In place of a technical expert or bureaucrat who will
determine impacts and mitigation, communities repeatedly stated that they are the experts of
their own social and economic conditions. More to the point, proponents should consult with
them about their needs, how to address them and what tools best achieve mitigation. The
113

The Board reports having conducted over 50 meetings with approximately 550 people in 13 different
communities. The goal was to speak to front‐line workers: those dealing with social, economic and cultural impacts
everyday. This included nurses, social workers, health and social services agencies, interagency committees,
economic development officers, renewable resource committees, impact advisory groups, social and cultural
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following chart (Table 1) summarizes the information provided in the community report and
evidences this seismic shift to community consultation in assessment.
Table 1
Impacts
Pressures On Social
And
Physical
Infrastructure

Sample Description
Population
influx
causing
pressure on service demands
(i.e health services). Qualified
local personnel move to
industry
In‐Migration And Family
and
community
Out‐Migration
dynamics change as result of
Effects
migration to work
Boom And Bust Non‐renewable
resource
Economic Cycles Of development is a relatively
Mining
short term activity

Training, Education Unskilled residents restricted to
And Job Retention
unskilled work

Pace Of Change On Social programming cannot
Vulnerable
handle new issues arising from
Communities
industrial development

Language
Cultural
Maintenance

And Maintaining culture in face of
different set of values from
development

SEIA ‐ Community Suggestions
Assessment of the infrastructure and
human resources needed to meet needs
of the increased population. Government
and industry prepare communities before
development
Better consideration of case studies of in‐
migration effects, as well as of alternative
work scheduling
Do Pre‐development planning. Use
impact benefit agreementss and socio‐
economic agreements to deal with
training
in
money
management,
alternative sources of economic and
social capital and economies which work
in harmony with subsistence lifestyles.
Use agreements to address job‐creation
with personal growth potential, long‐
term planning to provide training in
sectors with growth potential; early
proactive planning.
Assessment of cumulative impacts to
identify
local
strengths
and
vulnerabilities, wellness infrastructure
prior to development (parenting training,
treatment centres, counselors, youth
programs, healing strategies). Training to
self‐assess social economic and cultural
strengths.
Assessment to address loss of culture and
funding for: “bush schools”, use of elders,
traditional teachings in curricula,
language and cultural programs
Prepare communities for economic
changes; manage expectations of
increased standard of living

Housing And Cost Increased demand for housing
Of Living
during in‐migration inflates
housing
costs
and
overcrowding
Protection
Of Development
physically Use community environmental monitors
Cultural
And destroys
archaeological onsite for any new development with

28
Impacts
Heritage
Resources;

Impact
On
Traditional
Economy
And
Harvesting
Maintaining Jobs,
Business
And
Revenue In North
Vulnerable
Sub‐
Populations
(Women,
Elders,
Youth)
Addictions
And
Criminal Activity
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Sample Description
SEIA ‐ Community Suggestions
resources and harms the capacity to stop work if found. Use
spiritual powers of these areas traditional knowledge to identify areas
and suggest other land uses during
environmental assessment.
Participation in wage economy Use harvester compensation agreements
prevents traditional economy to compensate for change. Companies to
and development harvesting liaise with community for scheduling
success.
harvesting
Communities
cannot
take Use agreements to institute the principle
advantage of positive changes
that pre‐existing disadvantages should
have preferential access to benefits.
Influx of women into wage Use gender based assessment for greater
economy puts strains on understanding of community social
children “left to their own dynamics
devices”
Outside cultural influence, lack Assessment of community vulnerability
of skills in managing money, and prediction of impacts leading to more
pre‐existing
social
and prevention and mitigation
economic ills lead to unhealthy
behaviour

Essentially, this documents a shift in suggested methods for obtaining information from expert‐
focused to community‐focused sources. This contrasts sharply with the draft paper. While the
draft paper did address the relevance of community input, it focused on the use of adaptive
management and broad institutional participation. In the draft paper, the Review Board is
expected to determine what constitutes a socio‐economic impact and whether the suggested
measure mitigates it. In contrast, the community report indicates that the community is to play
a larger role in those determinations.
For example, the community report identifies a need for developers to do pre‐development
planning on how it will prepare citizenry for the impacts of boom and bust cycles of
development. However, instead of using external technical data to determine the needs in
boom‐times and bust‐times, the community report suggests the use of impact benefit and
socio‐economic agreements aimed at addressing the need for pre‐development planning in the
community. It makes the community, as party to the agreement, the authority on whether an
impact exists and whether it has been sufficiently mitigated. A second example relates to the
determination of impacts on traditional economies and harvesting. Instead of the Review Board
determining the impact of development on communities, the report suggested the negotiation
between the developer and the community for harvester compensation agreements. The
agreements are expected to compensate communities for change and build scheduled
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harvesting into development programs. A quick look at the above chart shows that other
impacts evidence a similar pattern. For almost every impact identified, the communities
suggested the need for their input in assessment.
Ultimately, communities identified themselves as the best source of data required for socio‐
economic assessment and mitigation. Moreover, the importance of community input into
identifying impacts and mitigation are not confined to what has been characterized as the
traditional domain of culture (e.g. language, education, traditional economies). While the
report did identify impacts on culture, many impacts refer to the broader socio‐economic
impacts of industrialization. Impacts include pressure on physical and social infrastructure such
as roads, health, and social services, housing, education and job training, etc. In short, the most
salient message the Report identified was the importance of involving communities in planning
every stage of development.
2. Finalized Guidelines
Following a multi‐year process, the Review Board released the SEIA guidelines in January 2007.
In accordance with the broad use of guidelines to publicize a board or tribunal’s policy position
and expectations, the SEIA guidelines achieve two main objectives: 1) they informed users what
substantive goals the Review Board is trying to achieve and 2) they informed users what
process to follow.
a. Substantive Requirements
The substantive goals of SEIA are generally to identify and evaluate the potential socio‐
economic and cultural impacts of a proposed development on people. In the SEIA guidelines
issued by the Review Board the main focus are the impacts on Indigenous peoples who have
based their economies on Mackenzie Valley lands. If the impacts are significant and adverse,
the SEIA guidelines aim to assist the reduction, removal or prevention of those impacts. If the
impacts are beneficial, the SEIA guidelines aim to assist their maximization.
Like most environmental assessment, SEIA is proponent‐led. Therefore, the developer
determines which communities and which socio‐economic components the proposed
development may impact. However, the SEIA guidelines play an essential role in telling the
developer what goals they are to achieve and how. Thus, the SEIA guidelines adopt a normative
position on healthy communities and the responsibility of private corporations to ensure their
existence. They itemize seven components of a healthy community, namely: health and well‐
being, sustainable wildlife harvesting and land use, protection of heritage and cultural
resources, equitable business and employment opportunities, population sustainability,
adequate services and infrastructure, adequate sustainable income and lifestyle.116
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This list has a number of remarkable aspects. The first is that it itemizes markers of a healthy
Aboriginal community in the North and impacts specific to Aboriginal peoples. For example, the
first component, Health and Well Being, is broken down into issues regarding: a) individual and
population health, b) community and cultural group cohesion, c) family cohesion, and d)
cultural maintenance.117 The second component, Sustainable Wildlife Harvesting and Land Use,
is broken down into issues regarding: a) hunting trapping and gathering ‐traditional economy,
b) recreational and traditional economy ‐ access to land, and c) value of alternative land
uses.118 These two components give a snapshot of the diverse issues in Aboriginal communities
which are potentially affected by development. They reveal that Aboriginal communities suffer
from ills similar to those suffered by many communities close to extractive resource
development. For example, seasonal work, migration, pressure on services such as health care
and education etc. However, for each of these issues, Aboriginal communities are impacted
differently.
The second and even more remarkable aspect of this list is that it vests responsibility for
identifying and mitigating impacts in private corporations. A quick glance at the seven
components reveals a list of public issues generally believed to be governmental
responsibilities. The preservation of health, food supply, culture, education, and infrastructure
are not the usual purview of private enterprise ‐ unless they are providing services for a fee.
Yet, these guidelines require developers to consider the health and well being of communities
that service or interact with resource workers in isolated regions. For instance, the SEIA
guidelines observe that increased levels of sexually transmitted diseases and increased alcohol
and drug use are associated with development. These two impacts put immense pressure on
families, as well as the community’s service providers. That a diamond drilling company is now
responsible for the ripple effect of a mine on a nearby community is notable. To be sure, this
shift to developer responsibility is not unique to the Mackenzie Valley. However, insofar as
these guidelines address the direct and indirect socio‐economic impacts of a proposal on
Aboriginal communities, it is at the forefront of impact assessment. This shift would explain
why the Review Board publicly reported that one of the challenges of implementing the
MVRMA “has been the acknowledgement and acceptance of new roles and responsibilities
related to socio‐economic impact assessment."119
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b. Procedural Requirements
In addition to the normative goals just discussed, the procedural requirements of the SEIA
guidelines also reinforce the centrality of community involvement in socio‐economic
assessment. The focus on community involvement in development planning seems to reflect
community‐based suggestions on how to improve the process, such as: early and continuous
community engagement, attention to community concerns, and avoidance of community
burnout. The impact of this approach on the finalized SEIA is the wholesale commitment to the
role of community involvement at each stage.
In many ways, the procedural requirements of SEIA are similar to those used for environmental
impact assessment.120 For instance, both require developers to go through six steps for each
level of assessment. The levels of assessment are: A) the Preliminary Screener; B) the
Environmental Assessment; and C) the Environmental Impact Review. For each level of
Assessment the developer must undertake the six steps: 1) scoping, 2) profiling, 3) identifying
and predicting impact, 4) identifying mitigation, 5) evaluating significance, and 6) imposing
mitigation and follow‐up. Despite these similarities, there are differences between the two
processes in regards to data collection, information sources, significance determination and
analytical tools. These differences have a noteworthy impact on assessment. More specifically,
these differences purposefully empower communities to determine socio‐economic impacts
and how they can be mitigated by making communities the direct source of socio‐economic
information or making community acquiescence a central feature.
Ultimately, the SEIA guidelines expect community engagement to undermine false assumptions
of SEIA. For example, developers often assume that increased disposable income can create
stronger families with greater opportunities for education and health. This is contradicted by
community evidence that increased disposable income can increase wasteful spending, alcohol
consumption, and migration of community members to urban centres ‐ all of which weaken
families.121 Aimed at achieving appropriate knowledge, community engagement saturates all
stages of the Preliminary Screening.
For example, at the ‘Scoping’ stage of a Preliminary Screening developers must determine what
issues should be analyzed in an SEIA and what level of SEIA is required (basic, moderate or
comprehensive). The Guidelines direct developers to three primary sources for socio‐economic
data: communities, governments and prior written research. The Guidelines instruct
developers that “early community engagement is required before the developer submits an
application for preliminary screening.”122 Moreover, the Review Board may conclude a
120

Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines (2004)
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development application is incomplete if it lacks evidence of early community engagement.123
Because scoping is meant to identify community and public concerns early in the process, a
superficial attempt to contact the community or circulate material will be deemed insufficient
by the Review Board. Instead, a developer is expected to use a variety of tools for early
engagement including: plain language discussions, individual and group interviews, focus
groups, community meetings, open houses, surveys and polling.124 Similar direction to engage
communities is found at the ‘Profiling’ stage, the ‘Predicting Impacts’ state and the
‘Mitigation’stage.
In summary, community involvement is crucial for the guideline’s to achieve their substantive
and procedural objectives. It is notable that for almost every stage of assessment there is
reference to the need for community input. This can be attributed to community involvement
in making the guidelines. Communities identified themselves as the best source of data
required for socio‐economic assessment in the community report and this became seminal to
the finalized guidelines. Within the assessment process, community engagement is meant to
elicit answers as to whether the public has concerns with the proposed development. The
strong language of the SEIA guidelines ensures that a community’s response is integral to the
preliminary screening. Hence, by focusing on community input, the SEIA guidelines evidence an
intention to create a regulatory framework that reflects Aboriginal communities in the region.

B. GUIDELINE APPLICATION: PROMOTING PRIVATE AGREEMENTS
The guideline requirements for community involvement have had an impact on the process of
conducting SEIA. Incorporating the value of community involvement has made successful
environmental assessment contingent upon community involvement. The Review Board’s
enforcement of this principle has fostered the negotiation of private agreements between
Indigenous communities and project proponents. In many ways, the process by which
guidelines are used to promote private agreements is a very simple story and mirrors much
resource development around the world. In essence, the Review Board uses various soft law
requirements for consultation with impacted communities to ensure that project proponents
have community approval. Failure to obtain approval results in a highly adversarial process with
unpredictable results. However, approval rarely comes by way of simple acquiescence.
Community approval is usually dependent upon some form of private agreement that address
community requirements.

123

Id.

124

Id. at 19.

2010]

WRITING THE RULES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT

33

The private agreements discussed here are the same or similar to the type of legally binding
agreements commonly struck between mineral developers and stakeholder communities in
resource‐rich areas around the world. The precise content of the agreements varies but they
commonly involve the provision of consent and/or support for mining or exploration on lands
within their jurisdiction. In return, developers give commitments designed to mitigate the
detrimental effects of development while enhancing the beneficial effects on the economy,
society and environment.
In the Mackenzie Valley, three types of agreements are most commonly used to address
impacts: 1) impact and benefit agreements, which itemize the benefits that an Aboriginal
community can expect from the development of a local resource; 2) socio‐economic
agreements, which address territorial economic development; and 3) environmental
agreements, which focus on mitigation, monitoring and follow‐up. Although each type of
agreement serves different purposes and the terms are tailored for each community, there are
certain commonalities between them that allow them to be grouped as negotiated agreements.
In Canada, the legal requirement for negotiated agreements principally comes from three legal
sources: 1) statutory requirements, including land claim or settlement agreements; 2) the
common law duty to consult under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982; and 3) administrative
regulations or guidelines. While the Review Board can draw on any of these legal requirements,
the most common authority for requiring consultation is its own guidelines. What follows is a
description of how the Review Board uses the guidelines to make its recommendations
contingent upon community approval, which is generally achieved through the negotiation or
promise to negotiate private agreements.
Once a proposal goes to the Review Board for environmental assessment the developer has the
onus to convince the Review Board that it is unlikely the proposed development will cause the
significant adverse impacts or public concerns raised at the preliminary screening.125 The
Review Board issues Terms of Reference (TOR), which inform the developer which
environmental or socio‐economic issues must be addressed. The developer is meant to address
the TOR in its Developer Assessment Report (DAR). At the Review Board, the developer is faced
with a choice. It can refute the evidence of public concern over socio‐economic impacts or it
can agree that there will be impacts but submit that they can be mitigated.
Where it refutes the evidence or fails to address the TOR, the SEIA guidelines outline a variety
of information sources to compare against the developer’s sources. In this case, the SEIA
guidelines state that the Review Board may obtain further SEIA information using a number of
techniques. These include but are not limited to 1) accepting technical submissions from any
party to the environmental assessment, including traditional knowledge reports and
socioeconomic studies; 2) hiring experts to examine the evidence; and 3) holding public
hearings where parties and members of the public may speak with, and ask questions of, any
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party. 126 The Guidelines also state that the role of Aboriginal communities and other potentially
affected groups at this stage is to comment on the developer’s SEIA, submit complementary or
contrasting evidence to the Review Board and propose mitigation to manage, reduce and/or
avoid impacts.127
Because the Review Board can premise its assessment on evidence presented by the public, it
encourages communities and individuals to present. Setting up a somewhat adversarial model,
the SEIA guidelines encourage parties to refute each other’s evidence.
[P]arties may submit comments on the accuracy of impact predictions
and preferred mitigation options in the form of technical reports, and/or
at technical or public hearings. Parties to the environmental assessment
are responsible for submitting their concerns or a comment about the
developer’s chosen methods and findings to the Review Board….they
should make these concerns known to the Review Board.128
The SEIA guidelines require all parties to “consider the assumptions inherent to the methods,
tools and models the developer used to determine mitigation.” Thus, they direct the other
parties to “identify strategies for mitigating impacts, and implementing measures and
mitigation in adaptive management programs.129 Moreover, the SEIA guidelines provide
methods for the developer to address impacts through negotiation.130
The prominent role of community‐based evidence in the Review Board’s evaluation of the
report acts as a disincentive against failing to consult communities. Rather than act at odds
with communities, developers are encouraged to use communities as a source of data and to
answer community concerns prior to seeking approval. While the Review Board has little
formal legal authority to force the parties to negotiate, the effect of enforcing the consultation
requirements in the SEIA guidelines is to foster negotiation. In this account, negotiated
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participation is a result of the deterrent effect of contradictory evidence that comes from
community participation in the agency’s socio‐economic assessment.

V. CHARACTERIZING PARTICIPATION
A. NEGOTIATION AS PARTICIPATION
Contextualizing negotiation in the consultation requirements of the SEIA guidelines is
significant. It grounds the Review Board’s support for private negotiation in the intention to
allow local participation to determine the terms of development. Essentially, the Review Board
supports negotiation as a method of socio‐economic assessment because it perceives it to offer
a better participatory model than the Review Board can offer alone. In this light, negotiation is
theorized as positive because Indigenous participation rationalizes the outcome. The
integration of socio‐economic assessment with private negotiation designed to address the
aspirations and concerns of Indigenous peoples is consequently seen as a positive step
consistent with participatory governance.131
In so far as private negotiation can incorporate community perspectives, a number of scholars
in diverse fields of study would likely agree with its characterization as participatory. The shift
to private negotiation matches the trend to characterize various types of decentralized
regulation as participatory. For example, arguments for collaborative problem‐solving, adaptive
management, and increased stakeholder participation each rely on increased tolerance for
methods such as negotiated approaches to regulation and permitting. As it relates to
environmental regulation, the change to flexible and coordinated legal forms is pervasive. As
Jane Holder remarks it “marks a vital shift in environmental law, as elsewhere, in favour of law
which, arguably, allows for negotiation and deliberation between government, industry, and
the public and makes room for innovation and creativity in decision‐making.”132 Contextualizing
the Review Board’s shift to negotiation in these broader trends supports its characterization as
participatory.
Scholars interested in the use of negotiation by Indigenous peoples see the shift to negotiation
as a de‐centering of regulation that empowers Indigenous stakeholders through their
participation. For example, in his seminal work on impact benefit agreements, Kennett argues
that the agreements reflect two primary goals for Aboriginal signatories: 1) to address the
adverse effects of large‐scale mineral development and 2) to ensure benefits of mineral
development flow to local communities.133 For Galbraith, Bradshaw, and Rutherford, impact
131
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benefit agreements are supra‐regulatory agreements that address deficiencies in the Northern
assessment process.134 This same argument is echoed in the work of O’Faircheallaigh, who
argues that insufficiencies in Australian and Canadian impact assessment have led to private
agreements.135 In short, socio‐economic problems are not resolved by formal participatory
processes in co‐management. Instead, negotiated instruments have the potential to address
those deficiencies. To this way of thinking, the private agreement is not only an ‘adjunct’ to the
public environmental assessment process but reflects and serves to redress its failings.
Ultimately, these accounts of negotiated instruments and the account provided in this paper
support the claim that new governance processes can increase the participation of marginalized
stakeholders in development. As seen here, the Review Board’s support for private negotiation
reflects its conscious attempt to allow communities to participate in the licensing of a
development project. That support is institutionalized through the creation of SEIA guidelines
and its enforcement by the Review Board. Consequently, the description of how this agency
uses soft law mechanisms to increase stakeholder participation affirms the effectiveness of new
governance initiatives aimed at improving marginalized stakeholder participation.

B. SOME LIMITS ON NEGOTIATION AS PARTICIPATION
While theorizing negotiated initiatives as participatory is on the rise, it should be recognized
that not everyone would agree that the use of negotiated instruments reflect community
member views vis a vis resource development. A growing scholarship questions whether impact
benefit agreements are a panacea to Indigenous communities or whether they maintain
inequity through market controls or private regulation.136 Rather than manifest traditional
134
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Indigenous values, these agreements are highly legalistic contracts which implement market‐
based policies for resource development. To sub‐groups that disagree with these terms,
theorizing negotiations as participatory is problematic where negotiations are pre‐conditioned
to undermine their input and values.
This criticism, essentially a complaint about representation, reflects a concern that the interests
of community members can be sidelined in negotiation. While the agreements are negotiated
by community representatives, the agreements might not be representative of community
members’ values or interests. In truth, this is a complaint endemic to political representation.
However, it has a particular resonance in relation to community stakeholders. This is because
the complaint brings into question the characterization of the community, upon which the
validity of community stakeholder participation rests. Moreover, the complaint complexifies
theorizing negotiation as deliberative democratic participation because negotiations can
prevent deliberation on terms that community members posit as reasonable but which industry
stakeholders reject and because industry can press for negotiations on issues community
members see as non‐negotiable. The following discussion addresses these issues in more detail.
As discussed above, the most fundamental difficulty with the reliance on community for
environmental decision‐making is that it often employs a false notion of community. As it
relates to private negotiations, community is often conceptualized as a single and unified entity
capable of bringing its knowledge to bear on decision‐making.137 In the Mackenzie Valley,
external expectations of community unity would mostly flow from the identification of
community with representative Indigenous governments. As governmental representatives, the
legal authority to bind their constituents is backed by liberal democratic ideals that they speak
for the community as a whole.
This conceptualization, however, relies on potentially inaccurate assumptions about the
representative infrastructure of communities. It presumes there to be unitary internal
processes by which the community representative obtains authority to negotiate when, in fact,
processes are multiple and pluralistic. To be sure, authority to negotiate necessitates formal
legal authority. However, it also presumes that the representative possesses a high degree of
normative authority. While liberal democratic theory can collapse these two requirements, this
may not accurately describe decision‐making in Indigenous communities in the Mackenzie
Valley. Effective representation of community interests does not necessarily follow from a
position in local government. Rather, the regular struggle over leadership among community
members and the continuing importance of hereditary chiefs and elders as sources of guidance
means that electoral positions may not legitimate negotiations. It is important to note that
many communities use regular and effective discussions to provide leadership with a mandate
on a particular issue. However, this is not always the case. A recent example illustrates this
point.
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Numerous proposals for Uranium development in the Upper Thelon River Basin in the
Northwest Territories were recently before the Review Board. The Upper Thelon basin is world‐
renowned as a unique and pristine eco‐system of huge ecological significance. The area is also
spiritually important to the Akaitcho, a Denesuline people, who regard the region as “the place
where God began”.138 Akaitcho community members and representatives of the Akaitcho
government expressed their concerns about the proposals. Based on extensive testimony, the
Review Board refused to recommend most of the projects. However, in accordance with
Federal government plans for the region, the proponents persevered. Subsequent to the
decisions of the Review Board news stories139 and letters from proponents indicated that there
were talks with a newly elected Chief of an Akaitcho community for exploration in the region.140
In agreement with the new Chief, the proponents sponsored a local event and purportedly
began negotiations. To date, no further exploration proposals have emerged. It seems that
continuing widespread community disapproval prevents it. However, the example precisely
illustrates the inaccuracy of assuming that the legal power of a political representative to
negotiate correlates with community perspectives on an issue.
138
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Questions of representation illustrate the point that Indigenous governments must currently
contend with effectively representing diverse public interests in the face of expectations that
the public interest will be defined and made certain in negotiations. While an expectation of
community stakeholder unity may be legally accurate, it is not analytically descriptive of the
diversity of opinions within communities.141 Rather than presume that representative
government is entirely reflective of the community’s interest, it would be more accurate to
suggest that local governments represent particular perspectives on an issue. Moreover, it is
certain groups within community stakeholders that are constructed and empowered by
governance regimes. By failing to recognize this, new governance and co‐management fail to
identify that there are values which operate at the community level but are not operationalized
in negotiations. That these limitations can be attributed to the failure of negotiation to account
for effective representation undermines a deliberative democratic account of negotiation.
Beyond the question whether negotiators are willing to represent sub‐group interests, the
more fundamental criticism of negotiated agreements is their limited ability to reflect the social
objectives of Indigenous communities. Even if there are no concerns about the willingness of
negotiators to represent certain values, there are still structural impediments to negotiating
terms which do them justice. This is the second reason why negotiated instruments may not
fully reflect community values vis a vis resource development. The inability of negotiations to
fully reflect participant values undermines their characterization as participatory in a
deliberative democratic sense.
Some theorize that traditional Indigenous values could never be reflected in private
agreements because they are incommensurable with market‐based values of resource
development.142 To this way of thinking, when choices arise (for example: choices over the
development of territory for hunting versus mining) market values trump Indigenous values
because the two cannot be reconciled. Scholarship on how incommensurable values are
navigated in co‐management portrays this as an issue of knowledge systems. This scholarship
mostly analyzes how Indigenous knowledge systems interact with bureaucratic ones. However,
the insight is the same. The two types of knowledge are incommensurable because they are
situated in particular social systems. For example, Paul Nadasdy accepts the
incommensurability of Indigenous and non‐Indigenous knowledge.143 To Nadasdy, the Kluane
people’s relationship to hunting, animism, and experience is knowledge that cannot be
actualized through institutional processes of the state. While he concedes that cross‐cultural
141

For a discussion of communal representation related to Indigenous self‐determination see B. Slattery, ‘The
Paradoxes of National Self‐Determination’ (1994) 32 4 Osgoode Hall L.J. 703.
142

Advocacy for incommensurability between Indigenous and especially Western traditions is characteristic of
authors like Takaiae Alfred. T. Alfred, Wasase Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom, (Broadview Press,
2005) at 104.
143

P. Nadasdy, Hunters and Bureaucrats: Power, Knowledge and Aboriginal State Relations in the Southwest Yukon
(UBC Press, 2003).

40

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 05

communication is possible, he argues that bureaucrats cannot do anything with the knowledge
because:
[A]ny attempt at knowledge integration is at least as much a political
process as an epistemological one…Neither government biologists nor
Kluane people are merely vessels containing different kinds of
knowledge. They are social beings embedded in a system of unequal
power relations that not only have a direct bearing on what qualifies as
knowledge but that also dictate how they can interact with one another
and what kinds of actions are seen as legitimate.144
A similar contention is that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the industrial
development of the land and its traditional uses for Indigenous peoples.145 This is related to the
argument that the objectives of conservation and development are at odds but it is more
specific to the particular use of the land. The argument is quite straightforward. Traditional
hunting practices and social arrangements require the resources to have a certain level of
holistic integrity. Large‐scale mining operations interrupt that integrity. Although operations
can be hundreds of miles from each other, the cumulative effect of development will eclipse
the possibility for traditional uses. Hence, communities are in fact choosing between two
incompatible uses of the land.
Concerns with incommensurability and incompatibility are related to other concerns with
bargaining inequalities highlighted in emerging scholarship on impact benefit agreements.146
Concerns with the relative inequality of the parties in negotiations stem from an imbalance in
financial resources, negotiating experience, knowledge about the particular resource and its
development, and structural assumptions about the benefit of commoditization. However,
these concerns seem to offer less absolute impediments to theorizing negotiation as
participatory in so far as one can conceive of procedures that would overcome the power
imbalances these differences produce. In contrast, concerns with the ability of negotiations to
capture the social ideals of communities, push their characterization as deliberative to the
limits.
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Scholarship on the relationship between negotiation and social goals addresses this
phenomenon of incompatibility vis a vis new governance methodology more generally.147 This
scholarship reveals that the pragmatic goals of negotiation in new governance intend to
constrain interests and ends that are incompatible with collaborative negotiation. New
governance requires orientation away from fixed, zero‐sum, foundational, rigid, sacred or moral
demands and towards achieving flexible, creative, long‐term collective economic and social
gain.148 This converts incommensurable values into forms of capital that can be traded,
supplanted, or enhanced by other interests. In short, it assumes that everything is negotiable.
The problematic effect of this methodology is it discourages marginalized stakeholders from
holding certain kinds of non‐negotiable values or positions. Consequently, it pre‐determines the
inequality and imbalance of power in negotiations.
These criticisms bring to light that although the agreements have been given the effect of
regulating socio‐economic impacts, they can fail to reflect the public objectives of socio‐
economic assessment. Rather than a mechanism for democratic participation, agreements
seem more indicative of market participation. Theorizing negotiation as participation thus
overlooks the difficulty of translating “collective considerations of social obligations, social
entitlement and social costs in individuated exchanges.149 In addition, the method meets few
indicia of public participation in so far as negotiations are neither transparent nor accountable
to the general public.150 Lastly, the outcome is not premised on any measure of justice outside
the rationales of contract. Impact benefit agreements are currently understood as private
contractual agreements. As such, they are not currently subject to any legal principles that do
not already apply to any given contract dealing with the provision of services. Thus, market
dominance is realized by the legal frameworks which condition participation so that the
satisfaction of its procedural requirements (agreement) is sufficient to rationalize its
substantive content, regardless of its effect. In truth, these are the relative inequalities built
into contracting which the law takes as part of market dealings. Once however, these
agreements are understood as standing in for other types of public regulation and serving some
public good, the constraint on regulatory objectives which results from the importation of the
principles of contract law and practice should be understood as problematic. As Hugh Collins
argues, once contracts are seen as regulatory, different questions arise as to the rules of
147
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contract law. New governance is forced to ask whether there are mechanisms in negotiation for
accountability and whether the absence of these mechanisms can be justified by benefits to
regulatory effectiveness.151
The recognition of these limitations does not destroy the characterization of negotiated
agreements as participatory. Such a conclusion would fail to grasp the potential benefits of
negotiation to communities and their appreciation of the process. There is no question that
direct negotiations between Aboriginal governments and developers offer a greater
opportunity for the community to determine the benefits of resource management than ever
before. Rather, the recognition of limitations forces a more specific characterization of
participation in private negotiations as market‐based. The purposes of the agreements are
related to the commoditization of resources and the financial benefits communities can obtain
in exchange for those resources. This characterization does not mean to imply that the
agreements do not have regulatory effects. However, as parties to these agreements,
communities and corporations are using private contracts to participate in the market economy
not to achieve the goals of public administration. This characterization forces the Review Board
to take a more active role in determining whether the terms meet the social goals of socio‐
economic assessment. Alternatively, it forces attempts to make negotiated instruments more
sensitive to the ideals of deliberative democratic participation to which strains of new
governance scholarship aspire.152

VI. WHERE TO FROM HERE?
If the discussion in this paper has revealed some difficulties in characterizing negotiation as
participatory, what is yet to be examined in the new governance literature is what role
regulatory agencies play in further endorsing these limitations. Ultimately, the discussion raises
questions as to the proper role of public government in relation to privately negotiated
agreements more generally. Whether an agency should play a more active role in ensuring the
deliberative democratic character of negotiations is highly debatable for new governance
advocates. Strong proponents of new governance would argue the role of administrative
agencies is to provide the infrastructure for information exchange between and among units.
Instead of solving the problems themselves, the agency’s task is to facilitate dialogue between
stakeholders by providing them with information benchmarks by which their outcomes can be
measured. Proposed solutions to the types of problems raised here would likely point to the
need for better collection and dissemination of information.
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This paper affirms that greater information about negotiations would go a long way to
addressing the significant democratic deficits of private negotiation. The current confidential
nature of agreements limits the amount of information the Review Board obtains from
community stakeholders. Additionally, confidentiality limits the type of contrary evidence an
agency will hear about the agreements’ terms. The effect is to put the Review Board into a
position of passive acceptance. It must assess the environmental and socio‐economic impacts in
the absence of substantive knowledge. This is despite the fact that the agreements are directed
at the same public purpose as that of the Review Board, the socio‐economic mitigation of
development.
However, the difficulties with negotiating the types of values impacted by resource
development suggest that more information is unlikely to be sufficient. Rather, there is a
greater role here for the agency to act as more than a facilitator. As a proponent of stakeholder
participation, it should be examining what type of participation it supports and whether it is
sufficient in any given case. If the Review Board purports to support deliberative democratic
principles, then it must begin to develop practices which pressure each of the stakeholders to
take responsibility for their realization. If they cannot be realized through negotiation, then the
Review Board must take responsibility for their realization for itself. What those practices
would look like is a subject for future research.

VII. CONCLUSION
This paper explored the extent to which new governance arrangements like co‐management
permit community stakeholders to participate in and transform regulation. The study of
participation in co‐management presented here illustrates: 1) that a high level of agency
support for community participation in rule‐making can lead to rules which reflects community
values on consultation; and 2) that agency implementation of consultation requirements has
led to the increased use of stakeholder negotiation as a mechanism for community
empowerment. Therefore, it affirms that it is possible for community stakeholders to
participate in new governance arrangements like co‐management and transform decision‐
making.
The first finding, that agency support for community participation can alter regulatory
rulemaking, is consistent with a deliberative democratic account of stakeholder participation in
new governance. However, the paper questions whether the use of stakeholder negotiation
meets the objectives of democratic participation as conceptualized in a deliberative account of
new governance. Using a heterogeneous understanding of community, the paper has argued
that characterizing negotiations as participatory remains tied to asking who within the
community is represented in negotiation and what kind of values can be negotiated. Criticism
that negotiations fail to translate certain community values means that agreements may offer a
limited type of participation, at least more limited than new governance has so far allowed in
its prognosis of stakeholder collaboration. Rather than offering a mechanism for deliberation,
agreements presume market participation. This illustrates the criticism that negotiations
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necessitate the commoditization of all values or demand their abandonment undermines its
deliberative democratic characterization. Consequently, it may be more helpful to characterize
these agreements as market‐based in order to be able to identify democratic deficiencies and
address them in the future.

